The Kurds in Iraq

As a state Iraq has recognized Kurdish rights to a greater say in internal affairs than either Iran or Turkey has done. Nevertheless it has also found itself involved in more major confrontations with the Kurds in recent yers and is consequently more widely known as oppressive to the Kurds. However, as elsewhere, there has been a second important dimension to the Kurdish question, that of the internal conflicts within Kurdish society and the way these have interacted with the conflict with government to the detriment of Kurdis national aspirations.

The Kurds under the British mandate 1918-1932

Modern Iraq emerged from the Ottoman provinces of Mesopotamia as a result of conquest by the British army, 1914-1918. The conquest had not been easy, and it was 1917 before Baghdad fell. In May 1918 Kirkuk was captured, and Mosul was taken, despite Ottoman protests, a few days after the armistice of Mudros (30 October 1918). In a few weeks the Ottomans had withdrawn from all of Mosul province, as far north as Zakhu. At first the British had in mind the creation of Arab state, and one or more semi-autonomous Kurdish provinces to be loosely attached to the Arab state, along the lines of Persident Wilson’s Fourteen Points, and with the advantage to Britain of considerable control over the economic unity of the whole of Iraq, and particularly over oil reserves which fell within Mosul province.There were good grounds for the establishment of a Kurdish province. The newly formed league of Nation Commission shortly after considered that:

Furtermore, of all the Muslim races ( Arab, Turk and Kurds ), The league of Nations Commissions considered the Kurds lived on the most friendely terms with the considerable Christian minority (both Nestorians and Chaldeans). But the Kurds of Mosul vilayet were profoundly disunited amongst themselves:

‘of the Kurds who inhabit the disputed territory, those who live north of the Greater Zab are, as regards language, ethnic affinities, and personal and economic relations, more closely connected with Kurds of … Turkey, whilst those who live south of Lesser Zab have more in common with the Kurds of Persia.’

Even within these tow zones the nomad tribs lived one life, the Kurdish sedentary tribesmen, preasants and townspeople another. Even the sedentary elements were divided, some into clans which, except under compulsion, were not local chieftain. Kurdish national feeling was only expressed in a negative form: opposition to political control by outsiders.

Nothing, perhaps, expressed Kurdish disarray more than the effort of the British to establish whether proposal that theirprotege, the Emir Faisal, should become King of all Iraq was acceptable to the Kurdish population. Mosul and Arbil voted in favour, Kirkuk voted fo a delay on its decision (decided in 1923 in favour of Faisal’s Iraq) though the interesting fact is the Kurds asked for a separate Kurdish province but only on condition that they were not incorporated with the Kurds of Sulaymaniya. Only

the population of the latter voted unconditionally against Faisl or any inclusion in Iraq.

In order to administer whislt a political solution was evolved, Britain chose to work through the traditional Kurdish leadership. It was not successful. In Sulaymaniya Britain invited Shaikh Mahmud Berzinji to act as governor in 1919, since he had done so for the Turks, on condition that he accepted British advice and orders, Shaikh Mahmud was extermely powerful locally, since he was both agha and shaikh. He was given an enlarged area, beyond his previous area of authority, which brought him into conflict with chiefs of other cclans, particularly those of Kirkuk and Kufri, Zakho and Amadiya, and those of Barzan and Arpil. Even in Halabja and Panjwin, 20 miles from his capital of Sulaymaniya, he was unable to exert his authority unchallenged. And in Baghdad were Kurdish notable families long since absorbed into the establishment, for example the Babans, who were hostile to his ambition. So when Shaikh Mahmud challenged British autor ity in 1919 he was removed and exiled to India.

Early British administration of Kurdistan was also interrupted by the attempt of Kemailist Turks to re-establish Turkish control over mountains as far south Rowanduz in 1922. With much of Iraqi Kurdistan in ferment, and liable to fall into pro-Turkish hands, the British recalled Shaikh Mahmud Barzinji instructing him to adhere to British policy. However, Shaikh Mamud entered into immediate correspondence with the Turks and thence into rebellion, crushed only when the British bombed his residence. With the re-establishment of British control of Sulaymaniya it was decided to incorporate the district into Iraq, with the agreement of a provisional Kurdish administration in Sulaymaniya whose only stipulation was that they would not continue in office if Shaikh Mahmud returend. When Britain withdrew its troops, this administration immediately resigend, fearing the wrath of Shaikh and his supporters. When in summer 1923 Shaikh Barzinji proceeded to attack his neighbours the British reprisals drover him out of Sulaymaniya.

Britain decided upon direct administration, through Kurdish officials, recognizing Kurdish culture, language and customs, but acting as supervisor which no other power, Iraqi or Kurd, at that time was in a position to do. During the negotiation with Kemalists in Lausanne a few Kurdish leaders petitioned Britain for separate Kurdish state in Iraqi Kurdistan. Rival Kurdish leaders - friendlier to Baghdad – pledged their loyalty to the Iraq Government.

Neither the British, nor the League of Nations responsible for awarding Britaian the mandate for Iraq, doubted that particularly in Sulaymaniya, if not elsewhere in Kurdistan, a Kurdish national feeling already existed. Albeit still in rudimentary form. Nevertheless, the Kurds of Kirkuk would not be ruled by Sulaymaniya Kurds, least of all by Shaikh Mahmud, whils within Sulaymaniya itself was a constituency of more educated Kurds opposed to him also. Furthermore the whole Kurdish area of Iraq was tied economically to the market towns and cities on the plain which were predominantly Arab or Turkoman.

Bratain hoped therefore that the kurds would be reconciled to incorporation within Arab Iraq. The Iraq Government had pledged itself to honour the League of Nations recommendations that the Kurds be allowed to use their language, both in school and in local adminstartion (not easy since there were a number od dialects, but cerainly possible to standardize), and that Kurds should comprise the administration of the region. But these pledges were not included in the Anglo-Iraqi treaty of 1930 which accorded Iraq its independence (implemented 1932). The Kurds naturally felt unsafe without written guarantees. Moreover no steps had been taken on the sensitive language issue, either to standardize the language, or to train teachers, or produce textbooks. In 1926 shortly before his resignation the Iraqi Prime Minister, Abd al Muhsin al Sa’dun, had declared:

‘ Thisnation canot live unless it gives all Iraqi elements their rights… The fate of Turkey should be a lesson to us as and should not revert to the policy formerly pursued by the Ottoman Government. We should give the Kurds their rights. Their official should be from among them: their tongue should their

His advice went unheeded. This was partly out governmental inertia, but also party out of apprehension that whatever special privileges were granded to the Kurds, the Shi’ia community of southeren Iraq might demand similar ones.

No sooner was the handover of Mosul to Iraq under way than Shaikh Mahmud Barzinji revolted, calling for a united Kurdistan.in spring 1931 he was defeated, and accepted town arrest for himself and his family in southern Iraq. Other Kurds demanded more moderate safeguards, but the government was unwilling to consider them. British officials remained embarrasssed and dissatisfied with the government’s pusilanimous steps to accommodate Kurdish feeling. Strikes the first real evidence of popular Kurdish aspirations in Iraq, since these were carried out by workers, merchants and townspeople.

With the arrest of Shaikh Mahmud Barzinji, another Kurdish chief took up a position of leadership amongst Kurdish ‘separatists’. That man was Mulla Mustafa Barzani, destined to become almost synonymous with Kurdish revolt until his death in 1979 in USA. Barzani was important, not only for his prolonged resistance of Baghdad, but also because he was classic representative of the shaikhly establishment, combining the secular power of an agha with that of religious (and charismatic) leaderschip.

Barzan was a remote village in north-east Iraq, since time immemorial an eara of lawlesseness and tribal warfare, barely touched by any government ever. Mulla Mustafa grandfather Shaikh Muhammad Barzani, had been prominent in the Naqshbandi order, and was the first Barzani to bring the family to prominence. As a result of the following he to created, both he and his descendants become temporal and spiritual leaders of the area. As he was to prove, even 40 years on, no other Kurd could so rally rank and file Kurds as could he, to the chagrin of those Kurds who wished to do away with the old order along with Turkish and Iraqi rule.

Mulla Mustafa’s first clash with the authorities was in connection with government attempts to settle Assyrian Christian refugees from Hakkari on land adjacent to Barzan, and with attempts to introduce police and taxation in to the area. He, his elder brother Shaikh Ahmad Barzani, and their family surrendered to the Turks over the border, but were amnestied in 1933. In 1943 Ten years later escaped to Barzan and resumed his conflict with the government, assisted by Kurdish nationalists, an indication that the Barzani family had acquired a more nationalist hue. By 1945 he was effective ruler in a wide area, interveining in inter-tribal disputes, in the government distribution of supplies, and repelling attempts by the Iraqi army to defeat him. Howevere, in late 1945 he was pushed over the border in to Iran , where he threw in his lot with the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) in Mahabad. He spent the next 12 years in exile in USSR.

There is a sense in which the conduct of neither the government nor the Kurdish people was likely to satisfy the other. Government decisions to introduce education and other benefits were lackadaisical in implementation, but had they been more rigorously pursused these would undoubtedly have eventually caused conflict within Kurdish society. As it was, the rule that officials in Kurdish areas must be Kurds or Kurdish-speaking began to undermine the position of both shaikh and agha, and to strengthen that of government since the agha was no longer the only intermediary with the civil service.

Mulla Mustafa Barzani was able to return to Iraq following the coup of 1958 carried out by General Qasim against the Hashemite neighbouring Kurds reflected the need of any aspiring chief to recognition from government and neighbours in order to fulfil his objectives. From the moment of his return Barzani established a close and friendly relationship with Qasim. On still not legalized KDP, using the prestige that rested on his own tribal following and allies (at least 6000 fighting men) who outnumbered any other Kurdish force, to persuade the KDP Politburo to accept his protege, and erstwhile Party Secretary, Hazam Abdullah, back in to the Party and subsequently back in to his old post. When he found himself opposed by Abdullah, howevere, his men stormed KDP headquarters and evicted him.

Barzani willingly co-operated with Qasim in the defeat of the latter’s Arab nationalist and pro-monarchist enemies. In March 1959 Barzani’s Kurds assisted in the massacre following an abortive rising in Mosul. Then he co-operated with the Communists to attack mutual Turkoman enemies in Kirkuk, another act that suited Qasim shortly after Qasim’s bidding. Barzani was rewarded with legalization of the KDP, thus strengthening his hand further in the party, with the restoration of Barzani land confiscated by the Hashemites, and with support against ‘anti-government’ Kurds. These ‘anti-government’ Kurds were longstanding enemies of the Barzani family, as well as supporters of the previous regime. Some of them, the neighbouring Zibaris of example, had been in feud with the Barzanis since the beginning of the century or ealier.others, the Baradost, Herki and Surchi helping the Hashemites defeat Barzani in the 1930s and 1940s. thus the conflict reflected longstanding internal Kurdis feuds, different Kurd-government alliance, as well as any nationalist ingredient.

When Barzani managed to assassinate the Zibbari chief in 1960, Qasim began to realize that he had been greatly mistaken in not restraining Barzani and not cultivating a counterbalance within Kurdistan. Qasim started to discourage Barzani from his implacable pursuit of old enemies, and began quietly to encourage and then arm some of Barzani’s adversaries. By the end of 1960 his break with Barzani was an open secret. In 1961 Barzani tried to fulfil Kurdish expectation from the new Constitution for the Kurdish region. But by then he probably realized that Qasim was unlikely to co-operate futher with him, not least because to accede to Barzani’s demands would raise the prestige and power of the latter in Kurdish circles still further, particularly in the KDP. Qasim had already gone further than the preceding regime in recognizing Kurdish rights, Kurdish activities had dramatically increased. The new constitution had accorded the Kurds an unprecedented position:

Several Kurds had been appointed to senior office. Kurdish puplication flourished. Although he had plenty of enemies in Kurdistan Barzani knew he could count on a number of disaffected aghas. Some of these regretted the passing of the Hashemites. They had a practical reason for doing so because Qasim’s much publicized agrarian reform law struck at the landlord class. Furthermore Barzani and these aghas could rely on the tribesmen following their lead party on account of unpopular new land an tobacco taxes. He therefore was contens to allow his fight with the Baghdad-supported Zibaris in winter 1960-1961 to drift in to widespread revolt against Qasim.

The KDP at first did no join the revolt, and only did so with reluctance when its hand was forced by Qasim’s proscription of the party. The KDP membership, and particualarly the Politburo, had been uneasy by the way in which Barzani had so easily been able to assume personal leadership on his return from exile. Barzani had played an important part in the KDP since 1946 but the conflict between his traditional view and that of urban and leftist elements had never been resolved. In 1946 Barzani had worsted the leftists, but in 1953 during his exils these – amongst whom Ibrahim Ahmad and Jalal Talabani of the Politburo were pre-eminent –asserted their collective leadership. Their unease wasshared by others at Barzani’s personality cult, strength and autocratic behaviour.

It was a clash between party democracy and traditional tribal leadership, and the old conflict traceable to the earlier years of nationalism in Kurdistan found new expression in the quarrels within the KDP. This unsatisfactory and largely unresolved situation resulted in the lack of a clear national goal, the predominance of tribal elements and loyalties that frequently frustrated nastionalist activities. Kurdish revolts: ‘were motivated as much by concepts of honour and pride possibilities of financial gain, and a desire to struggle against the encroaching authority of the government as by nationalist goal.s.’

Iraq’s neighbours used the war to their own advantage. Turkey, hostile to Qasim, was happy to adopt a benevolent neutralism, allwing Iraqi Kurds to move through Turkish territory in their war with Baghdad so long as they did not export their separatism to their oun Kurds. Iran was more postive in its support for Kurdish rebels, though like Turkey, conditional on Iraqi Kurdish understanding that Kurdish separatism was not for export to Iran. Barzani was willing go along with these stipulations.

Baghdad’s war against Kurds become one of the more constant realities of lief in Iraq. Qasim was overthrown in February 1963 by Ba’this, who themselves were ousted later on in the year Abd el Salam Arif. He quickly negotiated a ceasefire wit Barzani in February 1964. Given its urban leadership that the Politburo held sway only in the lower hills and towns. Its ‘programme of political education, establishing village councils, combating illiteracy and collecting taxes frightened and angreed feudal leaders, who already saw the KDP as an enemy.’ There was another importent factor . most of the politburo leadership came from the Sulaymaniya region, whilst Barzani’s stronghold lay in the north. The tow areas belongged do diffierent dialect, Sorani and Kurmanji, respectively. Depite temporary reconciliations, barzani and the KDP Politburo continued to feud, with the latter rejecting his leadership in 1967.

The ceasefire did not hold. However, in order to undercut Talabani of the Politburo, who was also tring to negotiate with the government, Barzani agreed to a truc in 1966. Shortly after he agreed to a Baghdad twelve-point programme (July 1966) which went a considerable way towards meeting Kurdish demands. But the government of Premier Bazzaz fell before it could implement the programme, and an uneasy relationship continued, with armed clashes, until the Ba’th coup of 1968.

The new sfforts at diallogue commenced with Barzani from late 1969 brought about a ceasefire and the declaration of a peace agreement om 11 March 1970. Disagreements during this period centred not on the question of Kurdish national rights, but on Barzani;s insistence that the government end its relation with the Talabani –Ahmad faction of KDP , and disband its Kurdish irregulars composed of anti-Barzani tribal elements. The government had to abandon its wish to act as moderator between the two faction, and complied with Barzani’s demand. On 29 September 1971 the sitauation deteriorated greatly with an unsuccessful attempt on Barzani's life. The government was the abvious and prime suspect. There was a second attempt in 1972. In summer 1972 Barzani, encouraged by Iran, the United States and Israel, consolidate his control off the Kurdish area, and increased his demands to includer wilder military and political authority, making provocative statements about support, and by September the Ba'th called for 'forestalling any further deteriorating relation between the two parties', a 11 March 1974 becoge the Autonomy Declaration of 1974 the Autonomy Law was an emasculated version of the 1970 agreement. Fighting intensified in eraly 1975 when the government decided to push the 60,00 or so Kurdish troops from the strip they still controlled near the border with Iran. The Kurdfs were backed by Iranian heavy guns operating inside Iraqi territory and using missiles to bring down Iraqi fighters in sidie inside Iraqi territory. The Iraqis found that the Kurds with their Iranian artillery could not only hold theire own but actually shell Arbil. The war reached a point where Iraq could not win unless Iranian support was cut off, and failing that faced the prospect of all-out war with Iran. Niether country wanded this. Efforts by other Arab government resulted in brining the Shah and Iraqi Vice-Persient Saddam Hussein together in Algiers. On 15 March 1975 their agreement was made public. Iraq ceded its claim to the whole of the long disputed Shatt al Arab waterway (the Tigris/Euphrates outlet south of Basra to the Gulf) and accepted the Thalweg Line partition (down the middle of the watercourse). Iran and Iraq affirmed:

This was Iran's reciprocal gift, the sealing of its border to the Kurdish insurgents.
The Algiers agreement destroyed any Kurdish prospect of sustaining the war. On 23 March 1975 the KDP, follwing a visit by Barzani to the Shah, decided to give up the fight.