Abdulkarim Qasim

The Iraqi �Revolution� of 1958, opened a new phase in Kurdish history in Iraq. On 14 July 1958, �Free Officers� in Iraq staged a successful coup against the Hashemite monarchy which came to be called the �Iraqi Revolution of 1958� [12]. In a power struggle ensued among the free officers, Qasim emerged as the successful leader of the Iraqi Revolution. Initially Qasim was on good terms with the Kurds. Article 23 of the Provisional Constitution on 27 July 1958, recognised the Kurds of Iraq as the partners with Arabs in the Iraqi state. It guaranteed the Kurdish rights within an Iraqi union. Mulla Mustafa Barzani who had been living in the Soviet Union for eleven years was welcomed by Qasim as a national hero on 6 October 1958 [13]. For the Kurds everything seemed to be desirable.

However, differences soon arose over autonomy and tension grew between Barzani and Qasim. It seemed that Qasim was not ready to recognise the rights of the Kurds. In early 1961, the Qasim regime began to harass the Kurdish leaders; some of them were arrested and Kurdish newspapers were banned. In July 1961, the KDP was prevented from holding its annual congress [14]. In July 1961 Mulla Mustafa sent a petition to the government and demanded autonomy. The demand was rejected by the Iraqi Revolutionary Council. Mulla Mustafa, who became wary of the intention of the Qasim�s regime, went to Barzan to prepare for an uprising[15].

Abdulkarim Qasim with Mulla Mustafa Barzani

War escalated between Mulla Mustafa and the Qasim government in September 1961. When Barzani prepared for the war Qasim refrained from attacking his forces. Instead he agitated the Kurdish tribes hostile to Barzani to fight him. The full-scale fighting began when the Arkon detachment led by Sheikh Abbas Muhammad, a tribe allied to Barzani, angered by the government''s land reform law, attacked a government force between Kirkuk and Suleimaniyeh. The government retaliated by bombarding Barzani villages. Barzani forces retaliated by occupying army�s frontier posts, Kurdish villages and towns. Therefore, a full-scale war began on 11 September 1961. On 16 September the government launched a major offensive which became known as the �First Offensive� [16]. The clashes between the Kurdish forces and the Qasim army continued until he was overthrown in 1963.

War stopped between the government and Kurdish forces when Qasim was removed from power in a coup led by the Ba''athists and General Abd al-Salaam Arif. In a power struggle between the Ba''athists and Arif, the Ba''athist were over-powered by General Arif in November 1963 [17]. Initially, the Iraqi government was not in a position to fight the Kurds. The Iraqi leaders were more concerned to consolidate their positions against their rivals. The Kurds too refrained from attacking the weak government forces hoping that the new government would recognise their rights. The Arif government ignored Kurdish autonomy, but as a gesture of good will he appointed two Kurds, Baba Ali Sheikh Mahmud and Brigadier Fuad Arif, to his cabinet [18].

General Abd al-Salaam Arif soon gave the indication that like his predecessor Qasim he was not interested in Kurdish autonomy. Tensions soon grew and clashes began between the government and Kurdish forces. On 10 June 1963, the Iraqi army started its �Second Offensive�. The Kurdish nationalists were labeled as a group of gangs by the government officials. On 2 July 1963, Lieutenant General Saleh Mahdi Ammash, the Defence Minister, denied that there was war going on between the Kurds and the government forces. He considered the fighting in Kurdistan as a national picnic by the army helped by civilians to destroy the gangs [19]. The fighting intensified; on 5 April 1965, and on 4 May 1966 the Iraqi army began their �Third and Fourth Offensives� [20]. During the �Fourth Offensive� Abd al-Salaam Arif died in a helicopter crash and his brother General Abd a-Rahman Arif replaced him [21].

General Abd a-Rahman Arif seemed to follow his predecessors'' path. When Abd al-Salaam Arif was killed Mulla Mustafa announced a one-month ceasefire. Both the Kurds and the government forces needed a break. Arif needed to consolidate his position; the Ba''athists had grown strong. He survived an attempted coup in June 1966. Soon it became evident that Abd al-Rahman Arif did not want to compromise. He stated he would never grant autonomy to the Kurds and he would never negotiate with them. The Iraqi army attacked the Kurdish forces, but suffered a major defeat [22].

Prime Minister Bazzaz, who believed the problem could not be solved by force, moved in to negotiate with the Kurds. As a result, on 29 June 1966 Prime Minister Bazzaz announced a �Fifteen Point Plan� which was accepted by Mulla Mustafa. The plan recognised Kurdish national rights within Iraq. The Kurdish language was recognised as an official language. The Bazzaz government promised decentralisation of the country''s political system, free elections of the administrative council and proportional representation for the Kurds in central government [23]. On 6 August 1966, Bazzaz was forced to resign and his successors had no intention of implementing his plan. Nevertheless, the Kurds leaned back and carefully watched the political process in Iraq and maintained dialogue with Arif. Dissatisfaction among the Kurdish ranks grew, but no major incident occurred between the government and Kurdish forces. President Arif was overthrown by a Ba''athist coup led by General Hassan al-Bakr on 17 July 1968 [24].

The new Ba''ath government was conscious that the Kurdish problem precipitated the downfall of the previous governments. It tried not to oppose the Kurds directly, but play them against each other. From the beginning the Ba''ath government announced its commitment to Bazzaz plan. Meanwhile it tried to play the Ibrahim Ahmad faction against Mulla Mustafa. Mulla Mustafa, angry at government attempts to dislodge him, reacted by opposing the government. He reactivated his clandestine radio and his forces clashed with the Iraqi army. At the same time there were clashes between the forces of Ibrahim Ahmad faction and Mulla Mustafa. As the forces of Ibrahim Ahmad were no match for those of Mulla Mustafa, the government entered into the fighting in favour of Ibrahim Ahmad faction. So the full-scale fighting between the government and Mulla Mustafa forces began in spring 1969. The Ba''athist government launched what became known as the �Fifth Offensive� [25]. In this fighting Mulla Mustafa''s forces were able to resist the government attacks well and the Iraqi government realised it could not make any peace with the Kurds unless Mulla Mustafa consented.

The Iraqi government finally decided to solve the Kurdish problem by granting autonomy to the Kurds of Iraq. The Iraqi government''s inability to defeat the Kurdish forces, fear of intervention by Iran, economic decline resulting from war, weakness of the army, and instability of the government forced the Ba''ath regime to find a solution to the Kurdish problem. After a series of negotiations, on 11 March 1970, the government signed a peace accord with the Kurds which became known as the �Manifesto of 11 March 1970�.

The �Manifesto of 11 March 1970� was the most comprehensive autonomy accord the Kurds had ever had. It was embodied in the new Iraqi constitution that the Kurds were co-nationals with the Arabs. The Kurds were given legislative power in their region. One of the two Vice-Presidents was to be a Kurd. There was a provision for a Kurdistan development budget, and the Kurdish language was recognised as an official language beside Arabic [26]. Although Mulla Mustafa was suspicious of the government sincerity he accept the accord. The Kurds and the government forces for a while lived in peace.

Lack of mutual trust between Mulla Mustafa and the Iraqi government prevented the implementation of the �Manifesto of 11 March 1970�. Each side blamed the other for failing to implement the Manifesto. There were two major problems in the way, one was oil-rich region of Kirkuk and the other vice presidency. The Kurds demanded to have a proportion of revenues from Kirkuk oil and they regarded Kirkuk as an inseparable part of Kurdistan. The Iraqi government was not ready to relinquish such oil-rich region. Both sides agreed to conduct a census to determine the future of the region. The Iraqi government to reduce the number of Kurds settled the Arabs in the region. The Kurds accused the government of delaying the census and seeking to arabise Kirkuk, Khanaghin and Sinjar [27]. In July 1970, the KDP nominated Muhammad Habib Karim as a candidate for the Iraqi vice presidency. His nomination was rejected by the Ba''ath government on the grounds that his background was Iranian [28].

Further problems arose between Barzani and the Iraqi government. Each side accused the other of breaching the agreement. The Kurds blamed the government for building up its armed forces and attacking the autonomous region. On 7 December 1970, Mulla Mustafa''s son, Idris, escaped an assassination attempt. On 29 September 1971, and on 15 July 1972, attempts were made to assassinate Mulla Mustafa Barzani. The Iraqi government was accused of being involved in these plots [29]. The Ba''ath regime also accused Barzani of getting arms from Iran, helping the Iranian Intelligence Service to gather information on Iraqi army, having a new broadcasting station radio in Iranian soil, siding with the Iranian forces in certain border clashes, and the training of Kurdish peshmargas (guerrillas) by the Iranian officers [30]. The tension rose high between the two sides. However, they tolerated each other until 1974.

The government was not happy with the way the Kurds escalated their demands so on 11 March 1974, the Iraqi government unilaterally announced its own �Autonomy Law� for the Kurdish Region [31]. The 1974 Law limited the Kurdish autonomy and Kurdish region and it was rejected by Mulla Mustafa Barzani. Fighting between the government and Mulla Mustafa forces started again. It lasted until March 1975, when Iran and Iraq signed an agreement in Algiers which ended the Kurdish insurgency.

The Algiers Agreement ended the Kurdish insurgency which had been going on since 1961. During the OPEC meeting, on 6 March 1975, the Shah of Iran and Saddam Hussein signed an agreement. In this accord Saddam Hussein agreed to recognise the Iranian sovereignty over half of the Shat al-Arab, abandon the Iraqi claim of the Khuzistan province of Iran, and end the subversion of the Iranian Baluchis along the border with Pakistan. The Shah undertook to withdraw his support to Kurdish insurgency in Iraq [32]. The Shah immediately withdrew his support and in a few days the Kurdish revolt came to its abrupt end.

The Algiers agreement had a devastating result for the Kurds. When Barzani announced the collapse of the armed struggle, thousands of peshmargas surrendered to the Iraqi forces and about 100,000 to 200,000 peshmargas and their family and supporters sought asylum in Iran [33]. The Iraqi government razed to the ground some 800 Kurdish villages along Iraq''s borders with Iran and Turkey to form a �security belt� to prevent the contact between the Kurds of Iraq with Turkey and Iran [34]. It was also taken as a provision to prevent future rebel activity in the area. The Kurdish families in Iraq were bundled up in army trucks to be settled in Southern Iraq. They were distributed in groups of five to be settled in special places build for this purpose or were distributed among the Arab villages. Life became very difficult for the Kurds who were not accustomed to the deserts. It is estimated that about 85 percent of those refugees who returned from Iran under the provision of general amnesty were deported to those desert camps. There is no exact figure of the Kurds exiled to Southern Iraq. It is estimated something between 50,000 to 350,000 persons [35]. The casualties of the war were also very high. On 15 January 1979, al-Thawra, an official Iraqi newspaper, put the numbers of Iraqi army casualties at about 16,000 while the Kurds claimed to have lost 2,000 peshmargas, excluding the civilian casualties who numbered thousands [36].

Conclusion
The Iraqi �Revolution� of 1958 signified three trends in Kurdish history in Iraqi Kurdistan. Firstly, for the first time the Kurds of Iraq were officially recognised as a partner in Iraqi state and their cultural and political rights were recognised. Before that the Kurds had never enjoyed an official status. This paved the way for the growth of �mass Kurdish nationalism� and gave the Kurds a hope that one day they would be able to enjoy their cultural and political rights.

Secondly, the Iraqi �Revolution� of 1958 signified a new phase in Kurdish revolt in Iraqi Kurdistan. A revolt which was no more tribal alone but supported by the different classes in Kurdish society such as teachers, merchants, students and so on. Thirdly, the Iraqi �Revolution� of 1958 created new lines of division within Kurdish insurgency. This time the division was not only based on tribal line, but on ideological basis and differences of opinions that has continued to the existing day.